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Abstract The question posed in this article is whether the right to health and
patents conflict or coexist. This question is examined from the perspective of the
issue of access to affordable medicines in developing countries focusing on the right
to health as set out in the ICESCR and patent standards (and flexibilities) as required
by the TRIPS Agreement. In the strict sense, there is no conflict between the right to
health and patents. ICESCR and TRIPS do not contain mutually exclusive obliga-
tions. Yet, it is shown that tension between the two does exist. There are a number
of ways in which such tension can be resolved. The UN Sub-Commission for the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights has contended that human rights should
enjoy primacy over patents, yet there is no evidence to suggest that the right to
health and/or access to essential medicines are considered prioritised norms under
international law. The WTO disagrees and views IPRs and human rights as com-
plementary. In international law there is a strong presumption against conflict. In
line with the principle of systemic integration a good faith interpretation of the
relevant WTO and human rights provisions should lead to a reading of TRIPS’
obligations which is coherent with human rights law. However, this balancing act
must also take place at the domestic level and the success of such a coexistence
approach, namely whether (developing) states are able to strike a balance between
access to medicines and patent protection, will depend much on the actual imple-
mentation and interpretation by states. Consequently, some examples of state
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practice regarding the interpretation and implementation of TRIPS in light of the
right to health are highlighted.
Keywords Access to medicines  Right to health  Patents  TRIPS  Conflict 
Coexistence
1 Introduction
Worldwide poor patients continue to face difficulties in obtaining or purchasing
essential medicines because of scarce availability and high prices. According to the
intuitive estimate of the World Health Organisation (WHO) at least one-third of the
world’s population have no regular access to medicines.1 The Millennium
Development Goals (MDG) Gap Task Force has stated that ‘the cost of many
essential medicines, especially those for chronic diseases, remains prohibitive in
many developing countries’.2
Public health and (the lack of) access to affordable medicines are global issues.
The role of intellectual property rights (IPRs), more specifically patents, in that
regard has been an issue of considerable debate for quite some time. The issue is
complex and multifaceted. A wide variety of factors contribute to the problem of the
lack of access to affordable medicines, from inadequate health care systems, limited
resources to corruption. This article limits itself to the (additional) impact of patent
protection on access. The argument often made in that regard is that patent
protection for medicines results in higher medicine prices and, thus, negatively
impacts patients’ access to medicines. Both economic theory (the fact that patent
protection in the majority of situations leads to a monopoly position) and empirical
studies find that in general patent protection for medicines goes hand in hand with
higher medicine prices.3
These higher prices are then justified, particularly by the pharmaceutical
industry, as essential in order to recoup their substantial research and development
costs. Thus, it is argued that without patent protection companies would have no
incentive to invest in innovation.4 Although the incentive to innovate function of
patent protection is not contested here, an important observation must be made.
Patent protection only provides an incentive to innovate in situations where the
innovator has a real possibility to recoup its investment, i.e. a profitable market.
Unfortunately, though, the majority of patients in developing countries, lacking
resources, do not provide such a profitable market. As a result the largest part of
health-related research and development is invested in treatments for diseases that
affect patients worldwide (such as cancer or diabetes) or are targeted mainly
towards patients in the developed world (such as the ‘female viagra’ Addyi to treat
1 WHO (2011), p. 8. See further Cameron et al. (2009).
2 MDG Gap Task Force (2012), p. 64.
3 CIPR (2002), pp. 36 et seq.; Scherer and Watal (2001), pp. 5 et seq. See also Maskus (2009); Borrell
(2007); Li (2008). Contra: Attaran (2004).
4 CIPR (2002), pp. 29–30; International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations
(2012), p. 50.
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female sexual dysfunction which has recently been approved in the US).5 What is
lacking, however, is research and development targeted at diseases primarily
prevalent in developing countries, also referred to as neglected and poverty-related
diseases.6
As such the problem with regard to access to medicines is two-fold in that
patients lack access to existing medicines that are (globally) available but for a
variety of reasons do not reach the patient in need, and the lack of research into and
the development of new medicines for diseases especially prevalent in developing
countries could lead to a decline in available treatments in the long term.
The issue of access to medicines lies at the crossroads between the systems of
international human rights law, intellectual property (IP) and trade law. In recent
years there has been a continuous expansion of IPRs, both in their subject matter
and scope. Part of this is due to the development of new technologies in the last few
decades and the resulting growing demand for new forms of legal protection by the
content owners and business.7 With the linking of IP to trade through the adoption
of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
as an annex to the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation (WTO) of
1994, IP is now part of the WTO framework. The move to link IP with trade has
been criticised.8
Not only the international IP system but also the international human rights
system has experienced expansion. Although the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) was adopted at the same time as
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), namely in 1966,
economic, social and cultural rights for a long time did not receive the same form of
recognition as civil and political rights. The work done in conceptualising and
clarifying socio-economic rights, through for example the adoption of General
Comments by treaty monitoring bodies but also within academia, has led to a
refinement of the rights of individuals and states’ obligations under international
human rights law.
This expansion has led to a blurring of the demarcation between the two fields,
creating dense policy spaces where previously unrelated sets of principles, norms
and rules increasingly overlap in incoherent and inconsistent ways.9 There has been
increasing recognition from a human rights perspective of the impact of the WTO
regime on issues going beyond trade, such as economic, social and environmental
concerns.10 This, however, is a relatively recent phenomenon. Within the
international trade community, human rights are not prominently visible. Issues
5 See Boseley (2015).
6 MDG Gap Task Force (2012), p. 71; CIPR (2002), pp. 29–30. See further Trouiller et al. (2002); Chirac
and Torreele (2006).
7 Helfer (2007), p. 973.
8 See for example Muzaka (2009), p. 1343.
9 See for a discussion on such regime expansion, Helfer (2007), pp. 980–982.
10 Harrison (2007), p. 36. See further Grosse Ruse-Kahn (2009).
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of social justice are rarely discussed in WTO bodies, and if they are, reference is not
made to the human rights discourse.11
It is only in the last two decades that an increasing awareness can be seen among
academics, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and international bodies of the
different intersections of trade, IP and human rights. For example, in 1996 South
Africa amended its Medicines Act to promote access to medicines when 39
pharmaceutical companies filed a suit challenging the amendments arguing that they
would destroy patent protection and, thus, were inconsistent with TRIPS. The US
supported the companies’ claim and put South Africa on its ‘watch list’, a list drawn
up by the US Trade Representative to signal countries, and permitting the US
President to demand action against such countries, which portray unjustifiable or
unreasonable trade practices, specifically including IP issues. The case was taken up
by South Africa’s civil society and received widespread international attention and
as a result was withdrawn in April 2001.12
There are two distinct conceptual approaches with respect to the interface
between IP and human rights: the conflict and coexistence approach.13 Some find
that IPRs and human rights are in fundamental conflict with each other. This view
sees strong IP protection as undermining a range of human rights obligations,
especially with respect to socio-economic rights.14 The United Nations (UN) Sub-
Commission on the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights, for example, stated
that ‘there are apparent conflicts between the intellectual property rights regime
embodied in the TRIPS Agreement, on the one hand, and international human rights
law, on the other’.15 In the case of access to medicines, patent protection for
pharmaceutical products is seen to undermine the right to health and life.
Proponents of this approach argue that to resolve such a conflict the normative
primacy of human rights law over IP law must be recognised in situations where
treaty obligations conflict.16 Others disagree and consider human rights and IPRs to
be essentially compatible. They see ‘both areas of law as concerned with the same
fundamental question: defining the appropriate scope of private monopoly power
that gives authors and inventors sufficient incentive to create and innovate, while
ensuring that the consuming public has adequate access to the fruits of their
efforts’.17 In short, the question here is how to strike a fair balance between
11 Harrison (2007), p. 36; Papadopoulou (2011), p. 271.
12 Kramer (2007), pp. 167–168. See further Sell (2001–2002), pp. 501–502; Hassim et al. (2007), p. 452.
13 Yu (2007), pp. 709–710; Helfer (2003), pp. 47–48; Haugen (2007), p. 102.
14 Helfer (2003), p. 48.
15 UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, ‘Resolution 2000/7.
Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights’, UN Doc. E/CN.4/SUB.2/RES/2000/7, para. 2.
16 See further Cullet (2003), pp. 157–159; Durojaye (2008), p. 69; Meier (2006), pp. 729 et seq.;
Dommen (2002).
17 Helfer (2003), p. 48.
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incentives, on the one hand, and access on the other. Thus, according to the latter
approach, human rights and IPRs can be considered to be compatible; although
there are differing views on how exactly the balance between the two should be
struck.18
This article will address this question—whether human rights and IPRs conflict
or coexist—from the perspective of the issue of access to affordable medicines in
developing countries focusing on the right to health as set out in the ICESCR and
patent standards (and flexibilities) as required by the TRIPS Agreement (Sect. 2).
The relationship between ICESCR and TRIPS is further examined in Sect. 3, which
asks whether a conflict can be identified. It is shown that tension between the two
exists and Sect. 4 continues with the manner in which to resolve such tension.
Consequently the two approaches to the human rights and IP interface—conflict and
coexistence—are discussed in more detail in Sect. 5 on the principle of the primacy
of human rights and Sect. 6 on the principle of systemic integration.
2 The Right to Health and Patents
In light of the question posed in this article, the first step is to define conflict. In its
report on the fragmentation of international law the International Law Commission
(ILC) raised the question of what is a conflict.19 It found that conflict could be
interpreted strictly and more widely. A strict definition of conflict presumes ‘that
conflict exists if it is possible for a party to two treaties to comply with one rule only
by thereby failing to comply with another rule’.20 Such a strict direct incompat-
ibility of treaty terms is the traditional understanding of conflict, setting a rather
high threshold for finding a conflict between treaties and is thus rightly considered
to be unduly narrow.21 The ILC report, however, also finds that there are ‘looser
understandings’ of what constitutes a conflict.22 Even though there is no strict
incompatibility between treaty provisions, a treaty may frustrate the goals of another
treaty. Therefore the report adopts a wide notion of conflict ‘as the situation where
two rules or principles suggest different ways of dealing with a problem’.23
18 See the response by the WTO to Resolution 2000/7 in UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights, ‘Report of the Secretary General on Intellectual Property Rights and Human
Rights’, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/12; and the response by the World Intellectual Property
Organisation in UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, ‘Report of
the Secretary General on Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights. Addendum’, UN Doc. E/CN.4/
Sub.2/2001/12/Add.1. See further Helfer (2003) p. 49; Yu (2006–2007), p. 1077; Helfer and Austin
(2011), p. 73.
19 International Law Commission (2006), para. 18.
20 Ibid., para. 24.
21 Haugen (2007), p. 102; Hestermeyer (2007), p. 175.
22 International Law Commission (2006), para. 24.
23 Ibid., para. 25.
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The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has rarely addressed the issue of what
constitutes a conflict of norms in international law, yet in the Jurisdictional
Immunities of the State case the Court did state that there could be no conflict when
two norms regulate different matters.24 Therefore it must first be assessed whether
the allegedly conflicting norms address the same subject matter (ratione materiae),
in addition to both applying to a state party at the same time (ratione personae,
ratione temporis).25
The majority of the 161 WTO members26 (more than 80 %) are also parties to the
ICESCR27 and are therefore faced with possible conflicting norms between the
TRIPS Agreement and ICESCR. Although the two treaties at a first glance seem to
address different subject matters (the protection of human rights vs. the protection
of IPRs) there are clear links between access to medicines, the right to health and
patents for medicines as will be set out in the following sections.
2.1 Access to Medicines and the Right to Health
There are a number of sources that protect access to essential medicines. The most
obvious and logical starting point being the right to health. The right to health is
codified in a number of instruments, most notably Article 25 of the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and Article 12 of the ICESCR.28
Article 12.1 recognises the ‘right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest
attainable standard of physical and mental health’. It is a fundamental right which
does not entail a right to be healthy, but encompasses a number of freedoms and
entitlements to enable individuals to attain their highest standard of health possible.
Paragraph 2 lists (non-exhaustively) a number of elements of the right to health,
including ‘the prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational
and other diseases’ and ‘the creation of conditions which would assure to all
medical service and medical attention in the event of sickness’. Today, the use of
medicines is an essential and indispensable part of the treatment of diseases. Access
to and the provision of medicines is, therefore, a vital element in enabling
individuals to attain their highest attainable standard of health.
24 ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening), Judgment of 3
February 2012, ICJ Reports 2012, p. 99, para. 93.
25 Haugen (2007), p. 104; Hestermeyer (2007), p. 174; Pauwelyn (2003), p. 165.
26 See the website of the WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm.
Accessed 30 Aug 2015.
27 At the time of writing (August 2015) 164 states are party to the ICESCR. See the website of the UN
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, http://indicators.ohchr.org. Last accessed 30 Aug
2015.
28 In addition, health-related rights are also found in a number of international treaties specifically
focusing on vulnerable groups; for example, Arts. 11.1(f), 12 and 14.2(b) of the 1979 Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and Art. 24 of the 1989 United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child. In the regional context, one will also find human rights
instruments which recognise health rights, such as Art. 11 of the revised 1961 European Social Charter,
Art. 16 of the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and Art. 10 of the Additional Protocol
to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
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Article 2.1 ICESCR sets out the principal obligation requiring States Parties to
progressively realise the rights laid down in the Covenant. In that regard they have a
margin of discretion as long as they do so by all appropriate means and to the
maximum of their available resources. In addition, Article 2.1 sets out obligations of
a more immediate nature: namely, to undertake steps towards full realisation and, as
stated in Articles 2.2 and 3 ICESCR, to respect and ensure the principle of non-
discrimination.
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR)—a
committee consisting of independent experts which was set up to monitor the
implementation of ICESCR—has interpreted the right to health and States Parties’
obligations in its General Comment No. 14 on the Right to the Highest Attainable
Standard of Health.29 Although formally not binding, it is an authoritative
interpretation of States Parties’ obligations under Article 12 ICESCR.30
According to the Committee, the right to health has four interrelated and essential
elements: availability, accessibility (physical and economic), acceptability and
quality; jointly known as the AAAQ framework. These criteria also apply to the
provision of essential medicines as a vital component of the right to health. The
focus in this article is on the element of ‘economic accessibility’ or, in other words,
affordability.
As it has also done with respect to other rights, the Committee makes use of the
tripartite typology of obligations: respect, protect and fulfil.31 The right to health,
therefore, contains both positive and negative duties for States Parties. Moreover,
the Committee considers the provision of essential medicines, as defined under the
WHO Action Programme on Essential Drugs, to be part of the minimum core
content of the right to health: those elements of a right without which the right
would be devoid of any meaning or relevance. As a result, the Committee finds that
‘a State Party cannot, under any circumstances whatsoever, justify its non-
compliance with the core-obligations […] which are non-derogable’.32 The
Committee also recognises that in the spirit of Articles 55 and 56 of the UN
Charter States Parties’ obligations are not confined to the domestic context. For
example, States Parties should ensure that due attention is given to the right to
health in international agreements and in their actions as members of international
organisations.33
29 CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 14. The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health’, UN
Doc. E/C.12/2000/4.
30 Vawda and Baker (2013), pp. 61–62; Tomuschat (2008), pp. 190–191; Sepu´lveda (2003), p. 42;
Craven (1995), p. 91. See also ICJ, Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democractic Republic
of the Congo), Judgment of 30 November 2010, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 639, para. 66. There the Court
stated, with respect to the jurisprudence including General Comments of the Human Rights Committee,
that although it ‘is in no way obliged […] to model its own interpreation of the Covenant on that of the
Committee, it believes that it should ascribe great weight to the interpretation adopted by this independent
body that was established specifically to supervise the application of that treaty’.
31 CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 14’, UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/4, para. 33.
32 Ibid., para. 47.
33 Ibid., para. 39. See also the 2012 Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the
Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, paras. 15, 17.
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Moreover, there is considerable state practice with regard to access to medicines,
particularly in relation to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria.34 The UN General
Assembly has frequently stressed the importance of making anti-retroviral (ARV)
medicines available at an affordable cost.35 With the adoption of the Millennium
Development Goals the international community, though, has not limited its
commitment to improving access to medicines only in the context of such
pandemics. Most recently (October 2015) the adoption of the Sustainable
Development Goals36 extends its commitment to ensuring healthy lives and
promoting well-being including access to safe, effective, quality and affordable
essential medicines and vaccines for all.
Finally, monitoring and accountability are integral features of a human rights-
based approach to health.37 Unfortunately, though, the UN human rights framework,
although very successful in creating and developing human rights norms, has been
less successful in providing effective enforcement mechanisms. The entry into force
of an Optional Protocol to the ICESCR in May 2013, allowing individuals to bring a
complaint directly before the CESCR, is an encouraging development in that
regard.38
In conclusion, access to medicines is a right under international human rights
law. For States Parties this entails an obligation of progressive realisation but also a
more immediate, core obligation to provide essential medicines. In addition, States
Parties, whether as members of international organisations or when interpreting and
implementing international agreements, must ensure that the right to health is given
due account. Consequently, members of the WTO should interpret and apply the
TRIPS Agreement in a manner which is consistent with their right to health
obligations.39 This could entail, for example, enabling and promoting the domestic
manufacturing of cheaper (generic) medicines by making full use of the TRIPS
flexibilities.
2.2 The TRIPS Agreement: Patent Protection for Medicines
The inclusion of IP within the framework of the WTO is one of the most significant
developments in the area of international IP protection. As a single undertaking, the
34 Hestermeyer (2007), p. 129.
35 See for example UN General Assembly, ‘Resolution S-26/2. Declaration of Commitment on HIV/
AIDS’, UN Doc. A/RES/S-26/2 (2001); ‘Resolution 60/262. Political Declaration on HIV/AIDS’, UN
Doc. A/RES/60/262 (2006); ‘Resolution 65/277. Political Declaration on HIV/AIDS: Intensifying Our
Efforts to Eliminate HIV/AIDS’, UN Doc. A/RES/65/277 (2011).
36 UN General Assembly, ‘Resolution 70/1. Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development’, UN Doc. A/RES/70/1 (2015).
37 Hunt and Leader (2010), p. 37.
38 At the time of writing (in August 2015) 21 States Parties to the ICESCR had ratified the Optional
Protocol to the ICESCR. See the website of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
http://indicators.ohchr.org. Accessed 30 August 2015.
39 See also the 2012 Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, para. 17.
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results of the WTO negotiations formed a single package to be implemented as
one treaty, namely the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation—
signed in Marrakesh in 1994 and which entered into force on January 1st 1995.
This WTO Agreement includes annexes on free trade in goods (General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT 1994), services (General Agreement on
Trade in Services, GATS), IPRs (TRIPS), dispute settlement (Dispute Settlement
Understanding, DSU) and a trade policy review mechanism. Consequently,
potential members either had to accept all agreements or not become a member to
the WTO.
The TRIPS Agreement is the first international agreement to comprehensively set
out substantive and procedural minimum standards for the protection of IPRs. The
WTO has widespread membership and, except for least developed members, all of
these members are required to fully implement TRIPS, which has greatly influenced
domestic developments in the field of patent protection for medicines. Furthermore,
contrary to previous IP conventions, the agreements concluded within the WTO
framework are subject to the robust dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO, a
marked difference compared to the weak and rather ineffective monitoring system
within the UN human rights framework.
Article 27 TRIPS introduced one of the major achievements of the TRIPS
Agreement, namely the extension of patent protection to all fields of technology. As
a result, members can no longer exclude medicines from patent protection. Articles
28 and 33 TRIPS oblige members to grant patent holders a set of exclusive rights
(i.e. to prevent third parties from making, using, offering for sale, selling or
importing for these purposes the patent product without consent) for a minimum
period of 20 years.
In addition to these minimum standards, the TRIPS Agreement provides a degree
of flexibility for members to balance patent protection with other public interests,
including public health and access to medicines. Firstly, the object and purpose of
the TRIPS Agreement—as can be found in its preamble and Articles 7 and 8—does
not limit itself to the protection of IPRs, but recognises the necessity to find a
balance between the promotion of technological innovation and the transfer and
dissemination of such technology. This is reflected in the wording of Article 7
TRIPS which was one of the main proposals made by developing countries during
the negotiations and reads as follows:
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer
and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and
users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and
economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.
Article 8.1 TRIPS is formulated more strongly in that it states that ‘members may
[…] adopt measures necessary to protect public health […] provided that such
measures are consistent with the provision of this Agreement’.
Both articles are promising in that they provide flexibility to guarantee access to
affordable medicines. On the other hand, their relevance is limited in that they
cannot be interpreted as general exception clauses comparable to Article XX GATT
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(or Article XIV GATS).40 Thus, their importance, and that of the preamble too, lies
in the fact that they set out the Agreement’s objectives and principles, and thus
provide the context for interpreting and implementing the TRIPS Agreement.
Secondly, the TRIPS Agreement leaves members free to determine the
appropriate method of implementation within their national legal systems as long
as TRIPS’ minimum standards are guaranteed.41 Many of its provisions allow for a
degree of interpretative flexibility, such as the terms ‘novelty’ and ‘inventiveness’
found in Article 27 TRIPS, which can be interpreted in a manner which is conducive
to social welfare and public health.
Thirdly, in addition to the flexibility inherent in its objective to strike a balance,
the TRIPS Agreement also provides a number of concrete options for developing
members to balance patent protection with the right of access to medicines,
particularly Articles 30 and 31 TRIPS. Consequently, within the limits of TRIPS,
developing members can incorporate a number of tools to ensure that a balance is
struck, such as a Bolar exception,42 compulsory licences (CL),43 and parallel
importation.44
Finally, the 2001 Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health45 is the first
public acknowledgment by the members of the WTO that there is a ‘problem’ and
that ‘the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members from taking
measures to protect public health’.46 The Doha Declaration and the use of TRIPS
flexibilities to protect public health will be further addressed below in Sect. 6.1.
In conclusion, the TRIPS Agreement sets out minimum standards which all WTO
members (with the exception of least developed countries (LDCs)) must implement
within their national systems. And although the TRIPS Agreement also provides
flexibility, there is no doubt that it has significantly curtailed developing members’
regulatory freedom with respect to patent protection for medicines.
3 ICESCR—TRIPS: A Conflict?
Having set out the international framework with respect to access to medicines, the
right to health and patents the question arises whether—in this context—the right to
health and patents conflict or coexist. The answer to this question depends on one’s
definition of conflict.
40 Hestermeyer (2007), p. 58.
41 See Art. 1 TRIPS.
42 I.e. the use of a patented invention during the patent term for the purposes of seeking regulatory
approval for the marketing of an equivalent generic version of the patented product once the patent term
has expired.
43 I.e. a licence granted by the government authorising the use of a patented invention by a third party
without authorisation of the right holder.
44 I.e. the importation of a patent-protected product into a country, without the authorisation of the right
holder, once that product has been legally placed on a foreign market.
45 WTO, ‘Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health Adopted at the Doha Ministerial
Conference, Fourth Session’, 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2.
46 Ibid., para. 4.
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To start with, there could be a strict conflict on the level of inconsistent
obligations. If obligations are mutually exclusive this would entail that the
implementation of TRIPS’ obligations regarding patents makes it impossible to
implement ICESCR’s obligations regarding the right to health or vice versa. This is
the traditional understanding of conflict and refers to a direct incompatibility of
treaty terms, setting a rather high threshold for finding a conflict between treaties
and is thus rightly considered to be unduly narrow.47 It is clear that the two treaties
do not contain mutually exclusive obligations.48 The ICESCR and TRIPS set out a
range of negative and positive obligations, yet both—although the ICESCR more so
than TRIPS—allow States Parties to have flexibility in the manner of
implementation.
Adopting a narrow, technical definition of conflict therefore leads to the
conclusion that there is no conflict between the ICESCR and TRIPS. Yet this would
be too easy a conclusion. Simply focusing on a technical definition of conflict
ignores the complexity of the interface between patents and the right to health. As
Pauwelyn has put it, ‘one essentially solves part of the problem by ignoring it’.49
Consequently, a broader definition of conflict is adopted here, referred to as tension,
in that both suggest different, arguably even contradictory, ways of dealing with the
issue of access to medicines.50
Although not strictly incompatible, the object and purpose of both treaties are
different.51 Simply put, the ICESCR focuses on human rights and human dignity
and, in that regard, on access as a crucial element for the realisation of the right to
health, while TRIPS focuses on striking a balance between access and protection
within the framework of IPRs. Setting the two treaties in the context of their
respective regimes, it is seen that the underlying values of the international trade
regime and the international human rights regime are distinct. Both have different
starting points and principal characteristics.52 The High Commissioner for Human
Rights has noted that there remain ‘fundamental differences of approach’ between
the two.53 The Special Rapporteur on the right to health has further noted that
TRIPS bears upon crucial elements of the right to health.54
47 Papadopoulou (2011), pp. 286–287; Pauwelyn (2003), p. 170; Haugen (2007), p. 102; Hestermeyer
(2007), p. 175. See for more information on why authors adopt a strict definition of conflict, Pauwelyn
(2003), pp. 172–175.
48 Haugen (2007), p. 103; Papadopoulou (2011), p. 287.
49 Pauwelyn (2003), pp. 170–171.
50 International Law Commission (2006), para. 25.
51 Haugen (2007), p. 102.
52 Papadopoulou (2011), p. 270.
53 UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, ‘Report of the High
Commissioner on the Impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
on Human Rights’, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13, para. 22.
54 UN Commission on Human Rights, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the
Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, Paul Hunt, Submitted in
Accordance with Commission Resolution 2002/31’, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2003/58, para. 86.
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This tension between TRIPS and ICESCR has presented itself in different forms,
such as in South Africa in the late 1990s when it decided to amend its legislation in
order to promote access to medicines.55 Similarly India faced pressure for its
introduction of section 3(d) to address ‘ever-greening’ in 2005 when Novartis filed a
suit challenging this provision.56 In both of these cases, but also in many other
situations worldwide, public pressure by civil society and health advocacy groups
have opposed so-called TRIPS-plus developments to strengthen IPRs with
considerable success.57
Finally, an element of crucial importance in this discussion is enforcement. There
are stark differences between the enforcement of TRIPS and international human
rights law. TRIPS falls under the WTO dispute settlement mechanism and if a WTO
member is found to be in violation of its obligations the Dispute Settlement Body
may, as a last resort, authorise the complainant to withdraw trade or other
concessions against the violator.58 The mere possibility of cross-retaliation is a
powerful incentive, particularly for developing members, to comply with their
TRIPS obligations.59 The ICESCR, on the other hand, does not have a very effective
enforcement mechanism and, even though human rights are considered to be
morally superior, the lack of enforcement gives them a weaker position compared to
WTO rules. Consequently, it would make sense for (developing) members to lean
more towards compliance with their obligations under TRIPS than under ICESCR.
Moreover, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism has not yet addressed the
impact of human rights on the interpretation of TRIPS. More generally, there is a
lack of explicit human rights references in the WTO Agreement, TRIPS, WTO
jurisprudence and even the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health. The
WTO adjudicative bodies can clarify and apply WTO law, but are not competent to
give direct effect to international human rights law and formally interpret and
enforce human rights treaties.60 This fragmentation within international law
establishes a factual hierarchy, independent of any normative hierarchy.61
55 See Sect. 1.
56 The Novartis case will be further discussed in Sect. 6.2.
57 3D (2009); BUKO Pharma-Kampagne and Institute of Public Health Bengaluru (2011). See also
Verger and Van Paassen (2013), p. 727.
58 See Art. 22 DSU.
59 Harrison (2007), p. 10; Vadi (2004), p. 202. It must be mentioned here, though, that to date cross-
retaliation has been rarely authorised. See Van Den Bossche and Zdouc (2013), p. 201.
60 Art. 3.2 DSU; WTO Appellate Body Report, Mexico—Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other
Beverages, adopted 24 March 2006, WT/DS308/AB/R, paras. 56, 78.
61 Hestermeyer (2007), p. 170; Papadopoulou (2011), p. 289.
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4 How to Resolve the Tension?
It has been shown that with respect to access to affordable medicines in developing
countries tension exists between the right to health (as found in the ICESCR) and
the minimum standards of the TRIPS Agreement. There are a number of ways in
which such tension can be dealt with.
International law contains a presumption against conflict. Thus one way in order
to avoid tension between obligations is through treaty interpretation.62 In this way
one interprets one norm in light of another norm in order to avoid a conflict. For
example, where TRIPS leaves members with room to determine the exact manner in
which to implement their obligations or where it contains vague terms that need
clarification, the right to health may be resorted to in order to inform policy choices
and to balance both obligations.63 Section 4 will address this—the coexistence
approach—further.
If treaty interpretation cannot lead to avoiding the conflict, the conflict is no
longer just apparent but genuine. In that case, a conflict must be resolved through a
series of conflict resolution techniques, such as the lex superior derogat legi inferior
(a superior norm prevails over an inferior norm), lex posterior derogat legi priori (a
later expression of state prevails over an earlier expression), and lex specialis
derogat legi generali (a special norm prevails over a general norm). As regards the
latter two, the relevance of these techniques to actually resolve a conflict here is
questionable. The lex posterior rule assumes that the conflicting norms emanate
from the same lawmaker, which is often not the case, and as such this rule is rarely
applied.64 This also holds true for the ICESCR and TRIPS, which do not stem from
the same lawmaker. The lex specialis rule is only applicable in a situation of conflict
between special and general international law, yet WTO law and international
human rights law are both subsystems of general international law. A further
limitation of these two rules, in this situation, is the nature of human rights treaties
in that they are different from traditional international treaties consisting of mostly
bilateral relations because they set out obligations of an objective nature excluding
reciprocity.65 Consequently, with respect to the tension between the right to health
and patent protection the lex posterior and lex specialis rules do not provide
appropriate conflict resolution techniques.
The simplest way to resolve the tension between TRIPS and the right to health
would be to establish that one of the two norms has a superior status under
international law and that is exactly what some human rights bodies and
commentators have argued for. Thus the principle of human rights primacy will
be addressed in the following section.
62 Pauwelyn (2003), p. 244.
63 Seuba (2010), p. 201.
64 International Law Commission (2006), para. 234.
65 Seuba (2010), pp. 210–214.
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5 The Principle of Human Rights Primacy
The UN human rights system first addressed the interface between IP and human
rights at the turn of the century. In a resolution adopted in 2000, the Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (the Sub-
Commission) was critical of the high level of IP protection required by the TRIPS
Agreement declaring that:
since the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement does not adequately reflect
the fundamental nature and indivisibility of all human rights, including the
right of everyone to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its
applications, the right to health, the right to food and the right to self-
determination, there are apparent conflicts between the intellectual property
rights regime embodied in the TRIPS Agreement, on the one hand, and
international human rights law, on the other.66
Consequently, it reminds all governments of the ‘primacy of human rights
obligations over economic policies and agreements’.67 This statement by the Sub-
Commission, however, does not have legal force as such since it is a non-binding
instrument, but it did set out an ambitious new agenda for addressing IP issues
within the UN human rights system.68
The two Special Rapporteurs appointed to undertake a study on the impact of
globalisation on human rights were very critical of the WTO stating that ‘the
assumptions on which the rules of WTO are based are grossly unfair and even
prejudiced’.69 In their view, the primacy of international human rights law over all
other regimes of international law is a basic and fundamental principle that should
not be departed from.70 The WTO disagreed with the criticism and views the
interface of IPRs and public interest as complementary rather than mutually
exclusive, as reflected in Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement.71
International law recognises that certain norms are superior to others. Jus cogens
or peremptory norms are norms ‘accepted and recognised by the international
community of states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted’.72
66 UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, ‘Resolution 2000/7.
Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights’, UN Doc. E/CN.4/SUB.2/RES/2000/7, para. 2. See for
more information Weissbrodt and Schoff (2003); Weissbrodt and Schoff (2004).
67 UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, ‘Resolution 2000/7.
Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights’, UN Doc. E/CN.4/SUB.2/RES/2000/7, para. 3. See
further Yigzaw (2015), pp. 37–38; Alam et al. (2011), p. 74.
68 Helfer (2007), p. 986.
69 UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, ‘Preliminary Report
Submitted by J. Oloka-Onyango and Deepika Udagama, in Accordance with Sub-Commission Resolution
1999/8 on Globalisation and Its Impact on the Full Enjoyment of Human Rights’, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/
2000/13, para. 14.
70 Ibid., para. 63.
71 UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, ‘Report of the Secretary-
General on Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights’, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/12, para. 7.
72 See Art. 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).
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Generally accepted examples include the prohibition of genocide, slavery, torture,
racial discrimination and crimes against humanity.73 Others have added (the
prohibition of gross violations of) the right to life, dignity and bodily integrity.74
The CESCR finds that the provision of essential medicines is part of the minimum
core content of the right to health and, thus, a non-derogable obligation.75
International practice, though, suggests a narrow approach to the characterisation of
jus cogens norms.76 There is no international consensus to extend jus cogens status
beyond the prohibitions mentioned above to human rights in general, specific human
rights—including the right to life—or certain elements of human rights. Moreover,
it is rather questionable whether the determination by the CESCR that the core
content of a right is non-derogable would lead to the conclusion that such core
content is therefore a prioritised norm under international law. Firstly, the ICESCR
itself does not formally prioritise certain elements of a right above others, nor does it
include a provision similar to the ICCPR prohibiting derogations from the rights
enshrined in the ICESCR. Quite the opposite, it provides for the possibility to
impose limitations (Article 4 ICESCR). In addition, the Committee’s General
Comment No. 14, although an authoritative interpretation, is a formally non-binding
instrument. Consequently, there is no evidence to suggest that the current list of
accepted peremptory norms includes the right to health or a right of access to
essential or even life-saving medicines.77
Furthermore, it has been argued that human rights as an emanation of UN Charter
obligations would enjoy primacy on the basis of Article 103 of the UN Charter.78
Article 103 states that ‘in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the
members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations
under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter
shall prevail’. Obligations flowing from human rights treaties adopted within the
UN framework, such as the ICESCR, are then considered to be obligations under
the Charter, particularly under Articles 55 and 56, and would thus prevail over WTO
obligations including TRIPS. However, this interpretation of Article 103 is not
tenable. Article 103 gives primacy to those obligations expressly stated in the UN
Charter and emanating from binding decisions by UN bodies, most notably Security
Council resolutions adopted under Chapter VII, but not to human rights treaty
obligations or non-binding resolutions adopted by UN human rights bodies.79
In conclusion, international law prioritises certain interests over others. The same
is true for the CESCR’s approach that prioritises certain elements of rights—the
minimum core content of a right—as non-derogable obligations. However, nothing
points to the conclusion that international law views human rights norms, except
those few prohibitions of jus cogens status, as having a higher status compared to
73 International Law Commission (2006), paras. 374–376.
74 Forman (2011), pp. 158–159; Viljoen (2007), p. 28.
75 CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 14’, UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/4, para. 43.
76 Vidmar (2013), p. 22.
77 Harrison (2007), p. 58; Papadopoulou (2011), pp. 290–291.
78 Yigzaw (2015), pp. 62–63.
79 International Law Commission (2006), para. 331.
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any other norm of international law.80 For a norm to attain the status of jus cogens it
must be recognised as such by the international community as a whole and there is
no evidence to assume that the international community views the right to health
and/or access to essential medicines to be of such a status. Consequently, any
tension between the right to health and patents cannot be resolved by reference to
the lex superior rule but must be resolved through treaty interpretation.
6 The Principle of Systemic Integration
In international law there is a strong presumption against conflict. It is assumed that
when states create new obligations under international law, they do not derogate
from their already existing obligations.81 Every sub-system of international law
must be considered in the light of the wider corpus of general international law,
including other sub-systems.82 The rules of treaty interpretation facilitate this
process. Article 31.3(c) VCLT states that, together with the context, ‘any relevant
rules of international law applicable in the relation between the parties’ shall be
taken into account when interpreting a treaty. This is referred to as a ‘principle of
systemic integration’ emphasising the unity of international law, where treaties are
contextually interpreted taking account of a broader normative environment within
international law.83 Article 31.3(c) VCLT is seen as a linking device between
disparate bodies of international law, and it is argued that it will enable the
recognition of the right to health within TRIPS.84
Consequently, where possible, WTO norms should be interpreted in a manner so
as to avoid any conflict or tension with other rules of international law. The
assumption therefore is that the tension between TRIPS and the right to health is not
a genuine conflict. Yet if a harmonious reading is not possible, the presumption
against conflict is rebutted and a genuine conflict must be acknowledged.85
6.1 Interpreting TRIPS in Light of the Right to Health
The principal way, therefore, in which to avoid a genuine conflict between TRIPS
and ICESCR is in interpreting the TRIPS Agreement in a manner which is
conducive to promoting and protecting the right to health and access to medicines.86
80 Hallo de Wolf (2013), pp. 199–200.
81 International Law Commission (2006), p. 37; Pauwelyn (2003), p. 207. See also ICJ, Right of Passage
over Indian Territory—Preliminary Objections (Portugal v. India), Judgment of 26 November 1957, ICJ
Reports 1957, p. 125, at p. 142. Here the ICJ found that ‘it is a rule of interpretation that a text emanating
from a government must, in principle, be interpreted as producing and intended to produce effects in
according with existing law and not in violation of it’.
82 Pauwelyn (2003), p. 201.
83 Ibid., p. 253; International Law Commission (2006), paras. 413 et seq.
84 Forman (2011), p. 163.
85 Pauwelyn (2003), p. 251.
86 See for example Papadopoulou (2011), pp. 293–294; Wojahn (2001–2002), pp. 491 et seq.
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Within the WTO dispute settlement system international human rights law is not
directly applicable. The WTO Appellate Body has however confirmed that WTO
law cannot be read in clinical isolation from public international law and that WTO
law should be interpreted according to customary rules of treaty interpretation,
meaning Article 31 and 32 VCLT.87 The WTO adjudicative bodies may therefore
take account of human rights norms when interpreting TRIPS, yet some caution is
required when drawing from an international agreement to which not all WTO
members are party.88 Moreover, according to the WTO, the TRIPS Agreement
promotes values which are essential for the realisation of human rights and aims at
striking an appropriate balance between IP protection and human rights standards.89
Such a reading is also in line with the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public
Health, which is explicit in the manner in which members should reconcile any
tension between IPRs and public health. Paragraph 4 states that:
[…] the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members from
taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our
commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and
should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO
Members’ right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to
medicines for all.
In this connection, we reaffirm the right of WTO Members to use, to the full,
the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which provide flexibility for this
purpose.
Although implicitly, the Doha Declaration refers here to the promotion and
protection of human rights.90 See for example the Special Rapporteur on the right to
health who stated that ‘[i]n this way, the Declaration reflects human rights
perspectives, especially the right to health and the right to enjoy the benefits of
scientific progress’.91 This balancing act, however, must take place at the national
level and the value of the flexibility within TRIPS will depend mainly on the
manner in which it is actually implemented by member states; an issue which will
be further discussed below in Sect. 6.2.
The notion of balancing incentives with access is found within international
human rights law. In her 2001 report, the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
87 WTO Appellate Body Report, United States—Standard for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
adopted 20 May 1996, WT/DS2/AB/R, p. 17.
88 WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities and Certain Member States—Measures
Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, adopted 1 June 2011, WT/DS316/AB/R, para. 844.
89 See CESCR, ‘Protection of Intellectual Property under the TRIPS Agreement. Background Paper
Submitted by the Secretariat of the WTO’, UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/18, paras. 13 et seq.
90 Seuba (2010), p. 214; Abbott (2006), p. 153.
91 UN Commission on Human Rights, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the
Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, Paul Hunt, Submitted in
Accordance with Commission Resolution 2002/31’, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2003/58, para. 87.
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in examining the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the right to
health, found that the starting point for a human rights analysis of the TRIPS
Agreement is Article 15 ICESCR (and Article 27 UDHR) which recognises the
right of everyone to the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific,
literary or artistic production of which he or she is the author and the right of
everyone to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications.92 Article
15 ICESCR identifies the need to balance promoting general public interests in
accessing new knowledge and protecting the interests of authors and inventors in
such knowledge, and binds States Parties to achieve such a balance when
designing an IP system.93
Balancing public and private interests is also not unfamiliar to IP laws. For
example, with respect to patents, the monopoly position granted to a right holder is
for a limited period and non-renewable, intended to provide inventors with the
ability to recoup research and development costs; in return inventors must disclose
their inventions, which has been a fundamental element of patent law since its
inception. As such, patents aim to ensure access to the knowledge in the short term
and access to the actual (patented) invention, and future inventions, in the long term.
Consequently, the High Commissioner found a degree of compatibility between
Article 15 and traditional IP systems, yet posited that the essential question is
‘where to strike the right balance’.94
General Comment No. 17 on the right of everyone to benefit from the protection
of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic
production of which he or she is the author (2005) further examines the relationship
between Article 15 ICESCR with systems of IP protection. The CESCR states that
the rights of authors under Article 15.1(c) ICESCR cannot be recognised in isolation
of the other rights enshrined in the Covenant and that States Parties are therefore
obliged to strike an adequate balance between the rights of authors and the other
provisions of the Covenant.95 Moreover:
[i]n striking this balance, the private interests of authors should not be unduly
favoured and the public interest in enjoying broad access to their productions
should be given due consideration. States Parties should therefore ensure that
their legal or other regimes for the protection of the moral and material
interests resulting from one’s scientific, literary or artistic productions
constitute no impediment to their ability to comply with their core obligations
in relation to the rights to food, health and education, as well as to take part in
cultural life and to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications,
or any other right enshrined in the Covenant.
92 UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, ‘Report of the High
Commissioner on the Impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
on Human Rights’, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13.
93 Ibid., para. 10.
94 Ibid., para. 12.
95 CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 17. The Right of Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of the
Moral and Material Interests Resulting from Any Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of Which He
or She Is the Author’, UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 (2005), para. 35.
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The CESCR offers some specific recommendations to achieve such a balance—for
example, States Parties have a ‘duty to prevent unreasonably high costs for access to
essential medicines’—stating that ultimately IP is a social product and has a social
function.96
In his 2002 preliminary report, Special Rapporteur Paul Hunt also touched upon
the relationship between TRIPS and human rights, stating that both Agreements
(including GATS) bear upon crucial elements of the right to health.97 According to
him international human rights law takes a position neither for nor against any
particular trade rule or policy as long as in practice the rule or policy actually
enhances the enjoyment of human rights and the process by which the rule or policy
is formulated, implemented and monitored is consistent with democratic and human
rights principles.98
Continuing Hunt’s work, Special Rapporteur Anand Grover submitted a report to
the Human Rights Council in 2009 exploring the impact of the TRIPS Agreement
on access to affordable medicines.99 There he stated that ‘from a right to health
perspective, developing countries and LDCs should be enabled to use TRIPS
flexibilities’.100 He referred to the following flexibilities which members should
incorporate into their national laws: make full use of the transition periods; define
the criteria of patentability; issue compulsory licences and provide for government
use; adopt the international exhaustion principle to facilitate parallel importation;
create limited exceptions to patent rights; and allow for opposition and revocation
procedures.
What the (legal) consequences of these reports and recommendations are is
unclear. Being non-binding they do not have any formal legal force. However, they
do constitute authoritative interpretations of states’ international human rights
obligations. Moreover, these recommendations could lead to political and legal
change by opening up the debate, questioning government officials on specific
issues during the process of state reporting, and providing guidance for states
wishing to implement a more human rights-friendly IP system.101
Thus, in line with the principle of systemic integration, a good faith interpretation
of the TRIPS Agreement should lead to a reading of TRIPS’ obligations in a way
that is coherent with human rights law and the right to health of which the Doha
Declaration is a good example. The success of such a coexistence approach—
whether (developing) states are able to strike a balance between access to medicines
96 Ibid.
97 UN Commission on Human Rights, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the
Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, Paul Hunt, Submitted in
Accordance with Commission Resolution 2002/31’, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2003/58, paras. 86 et seq.
98 UN Commission on Human Rights, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the
Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, Paul Hunt. Addendum.
Mission to the WTO’, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/49/add.1 para. 11.
99 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the
Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, Anand Grover’, UN Doc.
A/HRC/11/12 (2009).
100 Ibid., para. 27.
101 Helfer (2007), pp. 999–1000.
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and patent protection—will however depend much on the implementation and
interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement at the domestic level.
6.2 Striking a Balance at the Domestic Level?
Many areas of coexistence between human rights and IPRs have been analysed by
commentators from a variety of different perspectives.102 The aim here is to analyse
state practice regarding the interpretation and implementation of TRIPS from a right
to health perspective. This is by no means an exhaustive examination but is intended
to highlight some interesting examples of a coexistence approach so as to strike a
balance between the right to health and access to medicines, on the one hand, and
patent protection for such medicines, on the other, in a national (developing
country) context.
The starting point is that with respect to IPRs a ‘one size fits all’ approach is
undesirable. States have different levels of development and different needs.
Striking a fair balance between incentives for inventiveness and creativity and the
dissemination of creative and innovative productions is at the heart of IP policy. For
a developing country to be able to maximise domestic welfare it must make a trade-
off between innovating and imitating; the difficulty is to get the balance right. For
example, for a country like Uganda with almost no pharmaceutical manufacturing
capacity it is unrealistic to aim at innovative pharmaceutical research and
development; it is more realistic to begin with the small-scale production of
generic medicines. For example, Uganda decided to start manufacturing ARVs
through a joint venture between the Indian company Cipla and a Ugandan privately
owned pharmaceutical corporation, Quality Chemicals Ltd, due to concerns about
the long-term sustainability of importing medicines from India.103 Thus, a
(developing) state may want to set different levels of IP protection for different
industries, depending on where its comparative advantage lies and the particular
domestic context.104
Yet, the conclusion of the TRIPS Agreement led to a great deal of concern as to
how the establishment of global minimum levels of IP protection would affect
developing countries’ ability to improve public health, and more generally
economic and technological development, particularly if introducing (product)
patents for pharmaceuticals would increase medicine prices and limit the available
sources of medicines. As also recommended by many international human rights
bodies, the most pragmatic solution to address these concerns is to make full use of
the flexibilities and transitional periods incorporated in the TRIPS Agreement; an
approach that is in line with Articles 7 and 8 TRIPS and the Doha Declaration on
TRIPS and Public Health.
India is an example of a country that has made full use of the transition period by
providing product patent protection only in 2005 upon the expiry of its TRIPS
102 See for example Foster (2008); Anderson and Wager (2006); Matthews (2010b); Gervais (2008b).
103 Haakonsson and Richey (2007), p. 85.
104 Berger (2001–2002), p. 200; Matthews (2010a), p. 26.
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deadline.105 Until that time, it did not allow product patents to be granted to
medicines (patents for pharmaceutical processes were allowed). As a result, it was
able to develop a strong generic pharmaceutical industry.106
On the other side, even though it is a LDC and therefore not yet under an
obligation to fully implement TRIPS,107 Uganda started the process of reforming its
patent legislation in order to bring it into line with TRIPS’ requirements early. The
Uganda Law Reform Commission indicated that it might be politically advanta-
geous, in order to promote (foreign) investment, to implement TRIPS before the
expiry of the deadline.108 Although this position is understandable from a political
perspective, it must be warned against relinquishing regulatory freedom easily
without a thorough inquiry into its effects, both in the short and long term, on its
ability to address socio-economic problems such as public health.
The TRIPS Agreement obliges members to give effect to its provisions, yet it also
states that ‘[m]embers shall be free to determine the appropriate method of
implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system and
practice’.109 Thus, developing members have a certain amount of freedom when
implementing the TRIPS provisions, as long as they stay within the boundaries of
TRIPS.Article 27.1 TRIPS lays down the provisions with respect to patentable subject
matter and conditions for patentability. Even though it is no longer possible to exclude
medicines from patent protection, Article 27.1 does not define the concepts of novelty
or inventiveness and, subsequently, leaves considerable flexibility forWTOmembers
to decide the manner in which to implement and interpret this obligation.110
For example, India’s definition of ‘inventive step’ is unique in that it is stricter
than in many other countries as it requires an invention to involve a ‘technical
advance’, ‘economic significance’ or both, in addition to the fact that the invention
is not obvious to a person skilled in the art.111
India has further made use of this flexibility by introducing a unique section
regarding patentable subject matter. Section 3(d) is one of the most controversial
and discussed amendments made to the Indian Patents Act. It was introduced due to
fears surrounding the public health implications of so-called ‘evergreening’.112
A concern also recognised by the Indian Technical Expert Group on Patent Law
Issues that stated that ‘every effort must be made to provide drugs at affordable
105 Chaudhuri (2005), pp. 67–68; Mueller (2007), pp. 529–530.
106 Mey (2010), p. 411; George (2010), pp. 4–5.
107 WTO Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, ‘Extension of the Transition
Period under Article 66.1 for Least Developed Members’, 2013, IP/C/64.
108 Uganda Law Reform Commission (2004), p. 50.
109 Art. 1.1 TRIPS.
110 Chaudhuri (2005), p. 71; Mueller (2007), p. 563.
111 See sections 2(1) and 7(1) of the Indian Patents Act. See further Patent Office India (2011), para.
08.03.03; Ho (2011), p. 97; Kapczynski (2009), p. 1593; George (2010), p. 8.
112 ‘Evergreening’ refers to the practice of the pharmaceutical industry to effectively extend the term of
protection for patented pharmaceuticals by obtaining related patents for minor modifications made to the
original product, new delivery systems for the pharmaceuticals, or new uses of the pharmaceutical etc.
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prices to the people of India’.113 Firstly, section 3(d) prohibits patents for
derivatives—i.e. new forms of known substances—except if it can be shown that
they provide a significantly enhanced efficacy. This provision is unique and not
found in any other patent regime.114 It makes the ‘evergreening’ of pharmaceutical
patents almost impossible. Additionally, section 3(d) contains an absolute exception
to patentability by stating that the mere discovery of any new property of, or new
use for, a known substance is not considered patentable.115 India’s restrictive
position on this matter contrasts with the lenient approach in the US and Europe in
patenting second or subsequent medical uses of known pharmaceuticals.116
Section 3(d) is a good and creative example of a coexistence approach to patents
and human rights. By taking full advantage of the flexibility within TRIPS India
purposefully chose to implement TRIPS in a manner that aims at striking a balance
between TRIPS’ minimum standards and protecting access to medicines in line with
the right to health. This approach has, however, also received opposition and
criticism as to the TRIPS compliant nature of these provisions.117 Novartis
challenged the constitutionality and TRIPS compatibility of section 3(d) when the
Indian Patent Office refused to grant it a patent for its cancer medicine, Gleevec.118
The case was litigated up to the Indian Supreme Court, which upheld the
constitutionality of the provision (and found that it was not competent to decide on
its TRIPS compatibility).119
The Indian Supreme Court was very much aware of the broader debate and
controversy surrounding the case, acknowledging arguments made that India is
under an obligation to faithfully comply with its treaty commitments (i.e. TRIPS)
countered by arguments to protect India’s status as ‘the pharmacy of the world’. It
found that here it was its task to strike a balance between the need to promote
scientific and technological research and development while also keeping private
monopoly to a minimum.120
113 Mashelkar et al. (2006), para. 5.16; Mey (2010), p. 440; Kapczynski (2009), pp. 1590–1591; George
(2010), p. 7; Matthews (2013), p. 7.
114 Mueller (2007), p. 550.
115 Ibid., p. 557; Khader (2009), pp. 69 et seq.
116 Mueller (2007), p. 557.
117 Ibid., p. 558; Ho (2011), p. 95. Moreover, according to an Indian technical expert group on patent law
issues it would be inconsistent with TRIPS to limit the granting of patents for pharmaceutical substances
to NCEs (i.e. New Chemical or Medical Entities) only. Yet, the report does not actually address whether,
to this extent, the Patents Act is consistent with TRIPS; it states that there is a ‘perception’ that current
provisions in the Patents Act could be held to be TRIPS inconsistent and that restricting patentability to
NCEs could therefore have legal and scientific ramifications. One would assume, therefore, that
section 3(d) does not limit patent protection to NCEs only. See Mashelkar et al. (2006), paras. 5.6–5.7.
118 Khader (2009), pp. 86 et seq.; Amin (2007).
119 Indian Supreme Court, Novartis AG v. Union of India & Others, Civil Appeal Nos. 2706–2716, 2013.
120 Ibid., para. 4.
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The Supreme Court’s verdict was hailed as a victory for patients’ right of access
to essential medicines by civil society.121 While the case was under review,
domestic and international civil society and health groups organised a mass
mobilisation engaging in media and legislative advocacy to raise awareness about
the case and Novartis’ actions.122
There are also a couple of exception provisions within TRIPS that could provide
useful tools for developing countries in balancing access and patent protection,
among them most notably Article 31 TRIPS referring to compulsory licensing. The
use of a CL could be a valuable tool for developing and also developed countries to
increase generic production, importation and/or domestic competition and thus to
reduce medicine prices. Of course a patent holder, such as a pharmaceutical
corporation, can always grant a third party a voluntary licence to produce or use its
patented product or process. However, pharmaceutical corporations are not always
willing to do so and in such situations the granting of a CL, or merely the threat
thereof, can provide a useful tool. TRIPS leaves members free to determine the
grounds upon which a CL might be granted. In light of the Doha Declaration,
concerns regarding public health and access to medicines are without doubt a
legitimate ground for compulsory licensing.
Article 31 TRIPS sets out a rather long list of requirements regarding the
procedure and the scope of rights granted under a CL: the granting of a CL shall be
considered on its individual merits; (except in the case of a national emergency or
other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use)
efforts are made to obtain prior authorisation from the patent holder on reasonable
commercial terms and conditions and such efforts have not been successful within a
reasonable period of time; the patent holder must be paid adequate remuneration; a
CL shall be limited by its purpose, non-exclusive and non-assignable; a CL is
subject to judicial review; and predominantly for the supply of the domestic market.
Yet, the use of compulsory licensing to introduce generic competition will only be
effective as long as the procedure to receive a CL is simple and easy and the
required royalty payments are reasonable so as to ensure generic production is still
economically viable.
India—again—provides a good example of the implementation of TRIPS in light
of public health concerns in that its Patents Act defines the ‘reasonable period’ in
which an applicant must negotiate a voluntary licence with the patent holder,
namely a period not ordinarily exceeding 6 months.123 Consequently, a pharma-
ceutical corporation which is unwilling to grant a voluntary licence cannot unduly
delay the granting of a CL. Furthermore, the Indian Patents Act states, with regard
to the required royalty payment, that it must be ‘reasonable’ having regard to ‘the
nature of the invention, the expenditure incurred by the patent holder in making the
invention or developing it and obtaining a patent and keeping it in force, and other
121 See Me´decins Sans Frontie`res, ‘Indian Supreme Court Delivers Verdict in Novartis Case’, http://
www.msfaccess.org/about-us/media-room/press-releases/indian-supreme-court-delivers-verdict-novartis-
case. Accessed 15 April 2013.
122 George (2010), pp. 15–16.
123 Section 84(6)iv of the Indian Patents Act.
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relevant factors’ while also ensuring that ‘the patented articles are made available to
the public at a reasonably affordable price’.124
Finally, concern was raised with respect to the requirement of Article
31(f) TRIPS that use under a CL must be ‘predominately for the supply of the
domestic market’ and the usefulness of this tool for developing and least developed
members without adequate pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity. As such, it is
argued that Article 31 TRIPS failed in its purpose, because the countries which most
need it are not able to take advantage of it.125 Those countries that do have sufficient
domestic manufacturing capacity, like for example India and Brazil, are not able to
authorise the production of cheaper generic medicines under a CL for export to least
developed (or developing) countries. This problem was acknowledged in paragraph
6 of the Doha Declaration and since then this has been termed the ‘paragraph 6
problem’. The Doha Declaration instructed the TRIPS Council to find an
expeditious solution to this problem. Consequently, preceded by a statement by
its Chairperson, the WTO General Council adopted a Decision on August 30th,
2003, implementing a system to allow WTO Members with insufficient or no
manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector to make effective use of
compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement.126
The 2003 Decision is a temporary waiver of the limitation of Article 31(f) TRIPS
and sets out a detailed mechanism under which an (eligible) WTO member may
issue a CL in order to import medicines from another member which must also issue
a CL specifically for the purpose of exporting the required medicines. In 2005 the
WTO members approved an amendment to the TRIPS Agreement in the form of
Article 31bis in order to implement the system introduced by the 2003 Decision.127
The TRIPS Agreement will be formally amended once two-thirds of the members
have accepted the change. At the time of writing (in August 2015), 57 members
have accepted the amendment.128 Until the TRIPS amendment enters into force the
waiver introduced by the 2003 Decision will continue to apply.
The introduction of the waiver system, and more generally the Doha Declaration,
is firstly an explicit acknowledgement that there is a problem with regard to TRIPS
and public health. In addition, it shows that WTO members are—or at least have
been—willing to amend the TRIPS Agreement in view of public health concerns. In
that regard this is a step forward in that it provides further flexibility to developing
members so as to better protect access to medicines; a positive development from a
coexistence approach to TRIPS and the right to health.
124 Section 90(1)i & iii of the Indian Patents Act.
125 Mercurio (2006), p. 7.
126 WTO General Council, ‘Decision of 30 August 2003 on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health’, 2003, WT/L/540. See further
Hestermeyer (2007), p. 261.
127 WTO General Council, ‘Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement’, 2005, WT/L/641. See further
Gervais (2008a), pp. 396 et seq.
128 WTO, ‘Intellectual Property: TRIPS and Public Health. Members accepting amendment of the TRIPS
Agreement’, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/amendment_e.htm. Accessed 31 August 2015.
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Unfortunately, though, there are serious concerns as to the usefulness and
practical relevance of this system.129 After 10 years the amendment has still not
been ratified by two-thirds of WTO members and, of those that have, only a few
have passed legislation to implement the system, including Canada, the EU,
Norway, Switzerland, China and India.130 It is argued that the mechanism
introduced by the 2003 Decision is ‘too complex to have an effective impact on
price’.131 The mechanism is too burdensome especially for least developed but also
for developing members to be a truly effective tool in removing barriers to access to
affordable medicines. The many administrative conditions required to make use of
the system will obstruct the very purpose underlying it. Moreover, since 2003 the
system has only been used once. Namely, by Rwanda to import generic HIV/AIDS
medicines from Canada and the process took around three years.132 Consequently,
the system has not lived up to expectations that it would provide a useful tool for
developing and particularly least developed members struggling with ensuring
access to medicines.
In conclusion, this section highlighted some examples of state practice striking a
balance between patents and access to medicines by interpreting the TRIPS
Agreement in light of human rights standards, particularly the right to health.
7 Conclusion
This article posed the question whether the right to health and patents conflict or
coexist. This question was examined from the perspective of the issue of access to
affordable medicines in developing countries focusing on the right to health as set
out in the ICESCR and patent standards (and flexibilities) as required by the TRIPS
Agreement. In the strict sense, there is no conflict between the right to health and
patents. ICESCR and TRIPS do not contain mutually exclusive obligations.
However, it has been shown that tension arises from the application of both treaties.
Moreover, the lack of an effective enforcement mechanism within the UN human
rights system compared to the dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO creates a
factual hierarchy in favour of WTO rules.
There are a number of ways in which such tension can be dealt with. The UN
Sub-Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights has contended
that human rights should enjoy primacy over patents, yet there is no evidence to
129 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the
Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, Anand Grover’, UN Doc.
A/HRC/11/12 (2009), para. 41; Ovett (2007), p. 178; Chaudhuri (2005), p. 113; Verma (2010),
pp. 647–648.
130 See WTO, ‘Intellectual Property: TRIPS and Public Health. Members’ Laws Implementing the
‘‘Paragraph 6’’ System’, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/par6laws_e.htm. Accessed 31
August 2015.
131 Ovett (2007), p. 178.
132 WTO, ‘TRIPS: TRIPS and Public Health ‘‘Paragraph 6’’ System. Notifications by Importing WTO
Members’, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/public_health_notif_import_e.htm. Accessed 31
August 2015.
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suggest that the right to health and/or access to essential medicines are considered
prioritised norms under international law. The WTO disagreed and views IPRs and
human rights as complementary.
In international law there is a strong presumption against conflict. Both WTO law
and the ICESCR are sub-systems of international law, but that does not mean that
they operate in isolation of each other. They must be applied in a normative
environment and considered within the wider corpus of international law, including
general international law and other sub-systems. This is facilitated by customary
rules of treaty interpretation—Article 31.3(c) VCLT—and referred to as a principle
of systemic integration. Therefore, a good faith interpretation of the relevant WTO
and human rights provisions should lead to a reading of TRIPS’ obligations which is
coherent with human rights law, also within the WTO dispute settlement system.
This balancing act must also take place at the domestic level and the success of a
coexistence approach—whether (developing) states are able to strike a balance
between access to medicines and patent protection—will greatly depend on the
actual implementation and interpretation by member states. TRIPS does not
implement a ‘one size fits all’ approach to the protection of IPRs. There is no
inherent or genuine conflict between the right to health and patents. A pro-
development interpretation and implementation of the TRIPS Agreement should
allow developing members to strike a balance between complying with their
obligations under TRIPS and international human rights law. On the other hand,
certain issues, such as the potential of the proposed amendment to the TRIPS
Agreement, remain unresolved.
Moreover, the manner in which the TRIPS Agreement is at times interpreted is
worrying in that attempts are made to limit developing members’ freedom to fully
utilise the manoeuvring room within the TRIPS Agreement. Developing members
are often pressured by (some) developed states and pharmaceutical corporations to
not take full advantage of TRIPS’ flexibilities (and even accept TRIPS-plus
arrangements). This continuing pressure leads to increased tension between the right
to health and patents. Consequently, in light of states’ right to health obligations,
TRIPS’ objectives and principles, the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public
Health and from a coexistence approach to IP and human rights, members should,
firstly, take full advantage of TRIPS’ flexibility with a view to protecting public
health and ensuring access to medicines for all and, secondly, fully respect other
members’ right to do so.
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